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Most challenges in ICT for development (ICT4D) projects can be related to differences in 
perceptions of systems developers and their actual users. Such design-actuality gaps exist 
both because designers take an uninformed stance towards the user context, and also because 
problems that ICT4D projects address are nested in systems whose interplay is nearly 
impossible to predict. Although gaps are inevitable, users are not passive recipients whose 
only choices are to accept shortfalls in design or reject ICT4D technologies. Rather, users 
may act to remedy shortfalls through system work-arounds. In this paper we investigate the 
design use gap in the Brazilian correspondent banking model, an ICT4D project in which 
local small businesspeople interact with social, financial, government, and technical systems 
to provide financial services mostly for poor populations. Our findings suggest that 
correspondents’ acts to alter the financial and social systems proved sufficient to permit 
success of the project. Our results point to the importance of taking into account user actions 










Over the last two decades, ICT use has risen sharply in developing countries as governments 
improved public services, MNCs and other private companies implemented systems to 
support operations, and international agencies introduced ICTs to spawn economic 
development (Avgerou, 2003; Walsham, 2010). In response, research has focused on 
challenges in the design and implementation of ICTs in these domains. Moving from 
challenges to models of project performance continues to elude researchers, in part because a 
preponderance of descriptive rather than analytical research has favored actionable results 
over the creation of knowledge (Heeks, 2006). Studies have been successful, however, in 
identifying key misconceptions about the role of ICTs in promoting social and economic 
development, with findings that are particularly relevant to project performance in the realm 
of government and development agencies.  
 
Two core misconceptions are that ICTs are sufficient stand-alone solutions for complex 
social problems (Warschauer & Ames, 2010) and that transfers of ICTs between developed 
and developing countries account for technical literacies of users while underestimating 
cultural, political, educational, and infrastructural realities (Avgerou, 2008). Designers too 
often consider users in developing countries “merely passive recipients of the benefits of 
technology” (Andrade and Urquhart, 2012:281). Heeks (2002) proposed the idea of a 
“design-actuality gap” to describe situations in which designers’ narrow conception of the 
problem was inaccurate.  Warschauer and Ames (2010) provide evidence of this gap in 
describing how project sponsors conceived an ICT initiative as a simple solution to an 
economic development problem, which proved to be contrary to the views of local users, who 
thought the inconsistent use of ICTs across social strata amplified pre-existing socioeconomic 
differences. In general, misconceptions that emphasize technology and economic 
development may overlook the diversity of challenges associated with ICT for development 
(ICT4D) projects, thereby cloaking factors that prompt project success or failure (Kleine, 
2010).  
 
Although scholars recognize that they must expand the research lens to understand ITC4D 
project performance, the ICT4D literature has neither teased apart the role of various non-
technical systems (e.g., social, governmental, institutional) in shaping the context of ICT4D 
projects nor investigated how users – who ultimately must confront the difficulties posed by 
design-actuality gaps – alter their behavior or modify systems to compensate for design 
deficiencies. We explore these issues in this paper through an investigation of Brazilian 
correspondent banking, an ICT4D project in which local small businesspeople interact with 
social, financial, government, and technical systems to provide financial services for 
underserved populations.  
 
In their review of the ICT4D literature, Walsham and Sahay (2006) noted a paucity of theory 
and pointed to Heeks’ (2002) design-actuality gap as a possible building block. Following 
that lead, our contribution is, first, to show that design-actuality gaps exist not simply because 
designers take an uninformed stance towards the user context, but because the problems that 
ICT4D projects address are nested in systems whose interplay is nearly impossible to predict 
at the outset. In short, gaps are inevitable. Second, we show that although gaps are inevitable, 
users are not passive recipients whose only choices are to accept shortfalls in design or reject 
ICT4D technologies. Rather, users may act to remedy shortfalls through system work-
arounds. By extending the research lens to user actions in the face of design-actuality gaps, 
we expand the realm of factors to consider when modeling ICT4D performance and suggest 
that success is not reliant on gap-free designs. To set the stage for our inquiry, we briefly 
review research that pays attention to the design-actuality gap.  
 
2. The Design-Actuality Gap in ICT4D Projects 
When the United Nations set its Millennium Development Goals in 2000, many international 
development agencies responded by devoting resources to the deployment of technologies in 
developing countries, spawning the ICT4D movement. Wilson (2002: 12), who analyzed 101 
documents from 7 international development agencies (World Bank, Unesco, UNDP, IDRC, 
ITU, GKPF and USAID), found that each agency considered ICTs a “magic development 
solution” to the problem of poverty. When these ICT4D projects began to fail, scholars put 
forward a variety of reasons to explain poor performance.  
 
In some cases, scholars found fault with Western developers’ ignorance of local contexts in 
developing countries. As Suchman (2002: 143) noted, “Technologies designed at a distance 
generally are characterized by a design/use gap that requires either substantial reworking of 
the technology or, if that is impossible and prospective users are powerful enough, its 
rejection.” Along these lines, Cervantes et al. (2011:945), highlighted that implementing 
school laptop use in developing countries “is far more complex than what technology 
designers assume.” In other instances, scholars placed part of the blame on users. For 
example, in addition to finding problems in usability and support in ICT4D projects, Medhi 
et. al. (2010) also identified users’ ICT illiteracy and unease with technology as causes of 
project failure. Still other scholars blamed development agencies’ top-down approach for not 
supporting the activities of users (Thompson & Walsham, 2010). In almost every case, 
scholars noted a difference between users’ reality and designers’ conceptions. 
 
Heeks (2002) termed this difference the “design-actuality gap” (later, the “design-reality 
gap,” see Heeks, 2003). Scholars typically argue that designers can avoid this gap by taking a 
holistic approach to ICT4D projects. For example, Toyama (2010) as well as Silva and 
Hirschheim (2007) noted that most challenges in ICT4D projects are extra-technological, and 
that designers must consider political, social, cultural, economic, and other factors. Similarly, 
Puri (2007) identified four knowledge domains relevant to ICT4D projects – technology, 
application, community, and implementation – that designers needed to consider when 
creating ICT4D solutions. Notably, almost all scholars focus on correcting the gap at the 
point of design, not use, presumably on the grounds that users are either too politically weak 
or technologically illiterate to modify ICT4D solutions to remedy the problems that gaps 
occasion. Heeks (2002) is one of the few scholars to note that users might narrow design-
actuality gaps through improvisational acts.  Research has yet to examine when and how 
these improvisational acts might occur. We explore this possibility and build on the idea of 
different knowledge domains, which in the case of Brazilian correspondent banking we 
construe in terms of different systems (i.e., social, financial, governmental, technical), as we 




We chose Brazil’s correspondent banking model as the setting for our inquiry. Faced with 
new government laws mandating financial services to underserved populations, many of 
which were poor or remote, Brazil’s Central Bank set the regulation for the correspondent 
banking model to allow non-financial institutions such as grocery stores, post offices, and 
lottery shops to provide a range of financial services on behalf of traditional banks (Alves & 
Soares, 2006). Although this regulatory change allowed banks to offer a variety of financial 
services through correspondents, banks have come to restrict most correspondents to 
transactions related to government benefits delivery and bill payment collection (BCB 
2011:39).  
 
The technical system at the heart of this model consists of a rudimentary, easy-to-install 
package featuring a point-of- service machine or a personal computer as terminal, with 
limited accessory equipment such as barcode scanners and keypads. These terminals connect 
to bank servers directly via Internet, General Packet Radio Service, or even satellite. Many 
banks work with intermediary partners, called network integrators, who install this equipment 
for correspondents, and in some cases hire and train correspondents (Jayo et al., 2012).  
 
The Brazilian correspondent banking model is an intriguing ICT4D case for at least three 
reasons. First, a developing country plays the role of designer (see Khalil & Kenny, 2008). 
Heeks (2008:32) suggested that when developing countries are the designers, chances are 
greater for “designs around the poor’s specific resources, capacities, and demands.” Second, 
the correspondent banking model is simultaneously an intrinsic and instrumental case (Stake, 
1995). It is an intrinsic case because it is the largest branchless banking infrastructure in the 
world, serving as many as 80 million people through 150,000 outlets (BCB 2011). It is an 
instrumental case because many other countries use similar models of branchless banking. 
According to a World Bank research center dedicated to financial access for the poor, “What 
happens next in Brazil when it comes to correspondent banking will serve as a considerable 
source of learning for the rest of the world” (CGAP, 2010:4). Finally, because this case 
involves a government program designed to address a social problem via financial 
institutions operating with ICTs, it allows us to tease apart the role of each system in 
contributing to the design-actuality gap. 
 
3.1. Research Design  
To understand the interplay of the social, financial, technical, and governmental systems in 
the correspondent banking model, we interviewed 51 individuals across a variety of roles.  
Specifically, we interviewed 21 correspondents (owners or clerks in lottery shops, grocery 
stores, drugstores, Internet shops, and post offices); 15 bancarios
1
 (tellers or other agents in 
traditional banks); 12 bank managers (branch managers, mid-level managers, and senior level 
managers); 2 network integrators (third parties who handled equipment installation and 
support); and one of the main designers of the model (a bank director at the time of design).  
 
To ensure that our findings were not particular to any given bank, we spread our interviews 
across three banks that together account for more than 70% of the correspondents offering 
transactional services
2
. Two were public banks (Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econômica 
Federal) and one was private (Bradesco). We also chose two very different geographical 
locations in Brazil – the states of Sao Paulo and Pernambuco – to guard against results based 
on regional differences. In Sao Paulo, we interviewed bank executives in well-heeled 
neighborhoods; network integrators in corporate office parks; bank managers, bancarios, and 
correspondents in favelas (slums); and bank personnel in branches on the outskirts of the 
metropolitan area of the capital. In Pernambuco, we interviewed bank managers, bancarios, 
and correspondents in a city of 35,000 inhabitants 400 km from the state capital; we also 
interviewed correspondents in 5 nearby towns ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, in 
some cases accessible only by dirt road, where correspondents provided the only financial 
services. Working in air-conditioned offices, network integrators, bank managers, and 
bancarios wore professional attire and took breaks from work for our interviews; 
correspondents typically dressed casually  and often talked to us while serving customers in 
their small shops. 
 
 
                                                        
1 In Brazil, bancario refers to any employee of the bank from teller to bank president. For clarity, we reserve the 
term for non-managerial workers. 
2
 According to data from the Central Bank available at www.bcb.gov.br/?CORPAIS. 
3.2. Data Collection 
We conducted our interviews in teams consisting of one American and one Brazilian. 
Interviews followed a protocol, with flexibility for probing questions. The American team 
member asked questions in English, which the Brazilian researcher translated to Portuguese; 
almost all informants answered in Portuguese, which the Brazilian team member then 
translated to English. We audio recorded and transcribed interviews. In addition to 
interviews, we wrote detailed field notes to capture details of the physical environment, 
clientele, and the like. 
 
3.3. Data Analysis 
We begin our analysis with repeated readings of our interview data and fieldnotes as we 
searched for emergent themes, which we discussed in our research team to assess initially 
their resonance across different banks, geographic locations, and bank roles. One theme that 
struck us as a “core category” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008:104) was the apparent mismatch 
between how bank managers, bancarios, and network integrators viewed the correspondent 
banking model and how correspondents viewed it. To confirm this sense that arose from our 
reading and discussion, we generated codes from the literature, in this case building from 
Heeks’ (2002) idea of a design-actuality gap and Puri’s (2007) notion of knowledge domains. 
Using the resulting codes, we employed a constant comparison method (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008) to probe our data for conceptions and reality across four systems central to the 
correspondent banking model (social, financial, government, and technical), refining our 
codes as we went along to better fit our data. We also coded for actions that correspondents 
took to address the design-actuality gap. This approach enabled us to tease apart the role of 
each system in shaping conception and reality. 
 
4. Findings 
Our interviews revealed that designers and implementers in this case envisioned a simple 
technical solution for a simple social problem: By government decree, families all over Brazil 
were to receive their government benefits checks locally. But the banks charged with 
distributing these checks determined that opening branches in many remote areas of the 
country would be too costly. Instead, the banks authorized select grocery store owners and 
small businesspeople as “correspondents” who would be trained quickly. The correspondents 
would handle simple transactions, including the distribution of government checks and the 
collection of bill payments. Although the technical solution indeed proved simple – often 
arriving in a small kit and requiring little more than plugging into an electrical outlet for 
installation – the social problem required more than a transactional exchange would allow. 
To accommodate the rural public’s limited technical and financial literacy, correspondents 
filled the “design-actuality gap” by building personal, flexible social and financial 
relationships with clients that facilitated effective system workarounds. 
 
4.1. A Simple Problem, with a Simple Solution 
A key designer of Brazil’s correspondent model was Henrique Costabile, at that time a 
director with the government bank, Caixa Econômica Federal. Trained as an engineer, 
Henrique viewed the problem of distributing government benefit checks in terms of the 
logistics of cash flow:  
 
There was a law saying that Caixa should pay everybody in the country that 
has this profile [to receive government benefits]. So that was the problem: 
how can we pay benefit for studying in the middle of the Amazon, if there is no 
branch there? Then we came up with the correspondent banking solution. 
 
The solution was simple. Because most towns had—at bare minimum—a drugstore, bakery, 
or grocery store, the store’s infrastructure could be used to make bank transactions. In the 
case of a student in the middle of the Amazon, Henrique explained, “When he passes the 
card, what happens is we debit the funds for that benefit, and we credit the account of the 
bakery, and the bakery gives the money, physically, back to him. That is the transaction.”  
 
The correspondent model addressed the social problem incurred when people traveled long 
distances from their remote town to a city bank while simultaneously spurring local spending 
and development in ways that bank managers did not foresee. As Henrique explained,  
 
If you take a city like, for instance, close to Santarem in the middle of the 
Amazon, a person that was going to receive his pension funds, he would take a 
boat, ride this boat up to the river for seven days, go to a bigger city, where 
there is a bank to receive his money, and he wouldn’t go back to his city with 
the money. He would spend all the money in the big city and go back with the 
goods, in the same boat another seven days. So every month this person was 
killing 15 days of his life just to get the money and come back, and his village, 
there wasn’t economic development there because there is no money…Now, 
he won’t have to go up the river for seven days, he is still in his village, will 
receive the money in the drugstore, and will spend the money there. 
 
The correspondent solved another social and financial problem for bankers. Previously, rural 
travelers with their low-margin transactions formed long lines in city bank branches. Bank 
customers with high-margin transactions faced long waits as a result. The correspondent 
model moved the low-margin customers into local stores. Silvana, a Caixa lottery shop 
correspondent, explained that “[the branch] is for the elite and I’m for the simple, rural 
public…” Paula, a Banco do Brasil bancario, similarly remarked,  
 
A lot of people don’t have bank account, don’t have access to bank, don’t have 
proven income… this public doesn’t interest me; I am interested in people that 
want to do business… the banking correspondent takes out this load of people, 
leaving my branch wonderfully beautiful…[before,] thousands of non-clients, 
pedestrians would come, fight, speak loudly, and provoke discussions. These 
people don’t need to come here anymore; they can go by their lottery shop, 
grocery store, what have you and pay their bills. 
 
The bank managers reiterated the simplicity of the financial and technical systems that 
governed the correspondents’ activities. Correspondents confirmed that the technical system 
was easy to install and operate. Because correspondents handled simple transactions with 
limited equipment, their training was intentionally slim, as this exchange illustrates:  
 
Interviewer:   So, the training on the equipment, how long is it? One 
day, two days, a week? 
Network Integrator:  About two hours, max…I send a kit to the site…As soon 
as the kit gets there, I take the initiative to call the 
person to ask, “Is the kit there with you? Do you have 
time available to turn it on, for us to test?” 
Interviewer:  Oh, because it is the person himself who installs? 
Network Integrator:  Yes, it is just to plug the cord in the wall. 
 
4.2. A Design-Actuality Gap Prompts Problems  
Although designers and implementers thought they had a simple technical solution for a 
simple social, government, and financial problem, reality was a bit more complex. Three 
factors contributed to the design-actuality gap in the correspondent model. 
 
The first difference between design and actuality was that correspondents and clients viewed 
correspondents as synonymous with bancarios. Correspondents minimized their task 
differences with bankers. Marcio, a Caixa drugstore correspondent, noted over a dozen 
services that he could offer clients, pointing out only one that he could not perform that 
bancarios could: opening saving accounts. Clients who viewed correspondents as bancarios 
were frustrated when correspondents could not meet all their financial service demands. 
Moreover, clients expected correspondents to resolve government problems such as stopped 
benefits, reduced benefits, and threats to turn off utilities even though the correspondents’ 
simple interfaces offered no linkages to agency databases with client information. In this 
way, the correspondent banking model set up client expectations with respect to the 
governmental and financial systems that correspondents could not meet. 
 
A second issue arose in conjunction with the interaction of the technical and social systems. 
Although the equipment was simple to operate, it was not always reliable, with connections 
to the bank’s servers routinely going down. Marcio, a Caixa drugstore correspondent, 
confessed,  
 
The most difficult part is when the client gets here upset, aggravated, or 
furious with some personal problem and wanting something that at that 
moment we can’t offer. For example, sometimes, a client wants to pay its bill 
or cash some money and the system is down, and I can’t help, it’s a technical 
issue with the bank.  
 
In addition, the technology, in its simplicity, required client documents to be equally 
uncomplicated: any little variation in the document, such as a crease in a bill stub, could 
render the system unable to process the transaction. The poor people who were the 
correspondents’ clientele were often unable to maintain their documents in conditions 
sufficiently pristine for the technical system. 
 
A third factor contributing to the design-actuality gap arose from the financial system in the 
form of additional limitations set in place by the banks to limit their liability with respect to 
cash. These limits included caps on how much money a client could withdraw and how much 
total cash a correspondent could receive. For instance, Marcio, a Caixa drugstore 
correspondent, recounted, “The other day a guy walks in trying to cash R$1,500 and I had to 
explain that the limit here is R$1,000 and we are not the bank.” The banks also limited 
correspondents’ ability to make changes in accounts or rectify transactions after the fact.  
 
Thus, although designers provided a simple technical solution for serving poor and remote 
communities with essential banking services, there were more complicated social, 
government, and financial factors associated with the correspondent banking model. To 
remedy the design-actuality gap prompted by these factors, correspondents took to expanding 
their role. 
 
4.3. Role Expansion as a Solution to the Design-Actuality Gap 
Correspondents attempted to fill the design-actuality gap with small improvisational acts 
aimed at altering the two systems malleable to them: the social and financial systems. 
 
Correspondents altered the presumed social system by talking personally to clients, taking 
time to explain issues, getting to know their families and situations, directing them to 
appropriate services to resolve issues, and even helping them with personal problems not 
related to government benefits or bill payments. To handle clients who lacked both technical 
acumen and financial knowledge, and who routinely had problems in their benefits or bills, 
the correspondents needed to be more than mere processors of transactions as the originators 
of the correspondent model had in mind. Instead, in a personal manner, they needed to help 
people solve their personal problems. Silvana, a Caixa lottery shop correspondent, explained, 
“We’re the ‘human ATM.’ Caixa’s ATMs are there, but they don’t talk to the client, and here 
we do, we give them security and support.” When correspondents equated themselves to 
“human ATMs,” they reflected how they filled the design-actuality gap through extra-role 
behaviors.  
 
For example, clients expected the correspondents to resolve for them problems that they had 
with the bank, government, or utility services. Correspondents tried to determine where 
clients should go to resolve these problems because they felt a deep empathy for their clients, 
a sentiment that was much less prominent among the bancarios who we interviewed. Marcio, 
a Caixa drugstore correspondent described how he helped uninformed or misled clients:  
 
I explain what was done wrong and show how to do it right. There are people 
that don’t know the difference between R$5 or R$50. You can charge them 
R$50 instead of R$5 and they will thank you for doing so.  
 
In this manner, correspondents' roles expanded as they guided clients through the social 
system. Many correspondents described themselves as “public servants” because they were 
helping “people that are so simple, that haven’t ever gone to a bank, or are shy to go 
there…sometimes they think that going to a bank…is really hard, which it isn’t, but a humble 
person thinks that is, and they are more comfortable coming here” (Neusa, private bank 
correspondent).  
 
Correspondents similarly manipulated the financial system to overcome the design-actuality 
gap. For example, the 10-key pads for entering passwords proved overwhelming to many 
clients. Although the pads were meant to be displayed facing the clients, who would enter 
their passwords while standing across from the correspondent, the pad was most often 
positioned beside and facing the correspondent. Post office correspondent Maria explained, 
“On a regular basis is like this, an elderly comes and gives us their card and password. They 
trust us, and they don’t check the money, and we need to do this for them.” Network 
integrators who we interviewed, and who had not visited the field, were astounded to learn 
from us that clients shunned such a simple interface.  
 
Correspondents also developed workarounds to financial system restraints enacted by banks. 
For example, correspondents “borrowed” money from their business to cover gaps in the 
correspondent revenue so that they could process transactions for clients. As a Caixa grocery 
store correspondent, Luciene “took money from the market to take care of the customer, 
because if every now and then, someone comes and [the machine] is out of money, what will 
happen?” In sum, these findings show that correspondents were able to fill the design-
actuality gap by engaging in extra-role behaviors and system work-arounds. 
 
5. Discussion  
The Brazilian correspondent banking system was not free of a design-actuality gap. Rather, 
our analysis revealed that all four of the systems – social, governmental, financial, and 
technical – involved in the Brazilian correspondent banking model contributed to the design-
actuality gap, but in different ways and to different extents. This finding lends support to 
scholars’ contentions that designers would do well to consider extra-technological factors 
when contemplating ICT4D projects (Puri, 2007; Silva and Hirschheim, 2007; Toyama, 
2010).  
 
Despite having a design-actuality gap, the correspondent banking model nonetheless worked. 
Why? The model worked because, as Heeks (2002) suggested, correspondents carried out 
improvisational acts to narrow the design-actuality gap. Correspondents’ acts rendered them 
“human ATMs” who helped unsophisticated clients navigate social, government, financial, 
and technical systems. Correspondents’ actions further involved working around financial 
system restrictions to enable client service.  
 
Notably, only the financial and the social systems were malleable enough for correspondents’ 
actions to bridge the design-actuality gap. The government and technical systems, by 
contrast, lay beyond the correspondents’ grasp and thus were never a target for 
correspondents’ actions. The government system of welfare benefits that created the 
motivation for the correspondent model was beyond the grasp of correspondents because it 
operated at the federal level in a centralized and bureaucratic manner. Correspondents neither 
had access to government records or databases nor authorization to act on the behalf of 
government agencies. Thus, for example, when a client’s benefit changed or his payment was 
blocked for some reason, there was nothing a correspondent could do except to tell the client 
to report the problem to the relevant government agency. Puri (2007:358) classified this 
knowledge domain as implementation-specific, “built upon bureaucratic rules, guidelines, 
and norms prescribed by government agencies;” in our case, designers did not incorporate 
fully this domain of knowledge into the correspondent banking model and, as a result, 
correspondents had no ability to modify the government system. Likewise, the technical 
system, whose associated knowledge domain is “explicit, considered universally applicable, 
rational, analytical objective, codifiable, and hence transferable” (Puri, 2007:358), was, in the 
case of the correspondent banking model, also hardwired and strictly designed for delivering 
transactions. Correspondents did not know how to write computer code to modify the 
technical system and they lacked the technical expertise to otherwise bypass the highly 
structured menu interface. For this reason, correspondents could not carry out small 
improvisational acts to alter the technical system to bridge the design-actuality gap, 
something that might be possible in other ICT4D projects and certainly in many Western 
ones. 
 
Our findings suggest that, although multiple systems may co-construct design-actuality gaps, 
not all systems need be involved in bridging these gaps. Here, correspondents’ acts to alter 
the financial and social systems proved sufficient to permit success of the project. Our results 
point to the importance of taking into account user actions and the separate roles of individual 
systems when designing ICT4D projects and theorizing their performance. 
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